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IN THEW AKE OF LEE V. WEISMAN: THE FUTURE OF 
SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER IS UNCERTAIN AT 
BEST 
Stephen M. Durden* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One often hears the cliche, "as long as there are tests, there 
will be prayer in school." It might also be said, "as long as there 
are public schools, school prayer will be litigated."1 Nearly four 
decades after the United States Supreme Court first held that 
school prayer violated the Establishment Clause,2 the Court re-
cently ruled on the constitutionality of prayer in schools, 3 while 
it has left other school prayer cases still pending.4 These pend-
ing cases are factually different from the first school prayer 
cases; the question will be whether those factual differences 
create constitutional distinctions. After analyzing numerous 
school prayer court decisions, this article suggests that the Su-
preme Court decision in Lee v. Weisman 5 provides no guidance, 
or at best, inadequate guidance determining the constitutional-
ity of prayer given by students at school functions. 
Thirty years after the Supreme Court in Engel held that 
school prayer violates the Establishment Clause, the Court in 
*Stephen M. Durden, Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. 
J.D., University of Florida; B.A., University ofVirginia. 
1. The validity of prayer in schools has been litigated for more than a century. 
See e.g., Pfeiffer v. Board of Education City of Detroit, 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 
(1898). 
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
3. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). While this article will 
not attempt to analyze Santa Fe in depth, Santa Fe is relevant both for the similarity 
of facts and the Court's holding. In particular, the Court held "[o]ur analysis is properly 
guided by the principles in Lee." 
4. E.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F. 3d 1070 (11'" Cir. 2000) (en bane) 
cert granted, judgement vacated by Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S.Ct. 31 
(2000), and Chandler v. Sieglman, _ F3d _, 2000 WL 1557134 (11'" Cir. 2000). 
5. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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Lee v. Weisman6 held that graduation prayer, a particular sub-
set of school prayer, also violates the Establishment Clause. In 
the years between Engel and Lee both the state and federal 
courts reviewed a variety of different circumstances in which 
prayer was sought to be presented at school functions. 7 On the 
other hand, some courts were requested to force a school to 
permit prayer.8 These lower courts were evenly split as to 
whether prayer at graduation violated the Constitution. The 
lower court cases dealt with a wide variety of factual scenarios. 
Lee, for instance, dealt with the simplest of the post-Engel 
graduation prayer cases.9 There, the Court ignored the twenty 
year-old standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence ar-
ticulated Lemon v. Kurtzman. 10 Lemon mandated that, in order 
to avoid culpability under the Establishment Clause, "[f]irst 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an ex-
cessive entanglement with religion."'11 In addition to ignoring 
6. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
7. See Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 401, 719 P.2d 875 (1986) [hereinafter 
Kay I]; Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985) [herein-
after Stein I], rev'd Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch.,822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) 
[hereinafter Stein II]; Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch, Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 
(1987); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 
1989); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990) [hereinafter Weisman I], affd, 
Weisman v. Lee 908 F.2d 1990, affd sub nom, Weisman v. Lee [hereinafter Weisman 
I]; Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989) [hereinafter Sands I], 
rev'd Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist. 809 P.2d 809, (en bane) (reh'g denied), (1991) 
[hereinafter Sands Ill; Albright v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 692 
(D. Utah 1991); Griffin v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, (D. Kan. 1992); Guidry v. Brous-
sard, 897 F.2d 181 (5'h Cir. 1990); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist .• 342 F. 
Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974); 
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 508 
U.S. 967, (1993); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993); 
Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. 563 
F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. 
Dist. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Graham v. Cent. Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur 
County, 608 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Brody ex rei Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 
F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831, cert. 
denied,490 U.S. 1090 (1989). 
8. See e.g., Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. At 331; Guidry, 897 F.2d at 181. 
9. Other cases also dealt with facts which were essentially indistinguishable 
from those in Lee. See e.g., Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809. 
10. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The heart of the Lemon test was first set forth in School 
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)); 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
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Lemon, the Court in Lee also ignored its prior school prayer ju-
risprudence found in Engel and Abington. In deciding Lee, the 
Court either failed to answer the difficult graduation prayer 
questions raised in the thirty years after Engel, or answered 
the questions without referring to any of the factual circum-
stances related to these difficult graduation prayer questions. 
At the same time, the Court eroded the barriers against school 
prayer erected in Engel and Abington. 
School prayer, in its most basic meaning, refers to a school-
sponsored prayer. 12 Engel and Abington did not deal with com-
plex problems concerning prayer during school hours or during 
school functions. Rather, they dealt with a more fundamental 
perplexity: whether or not a school-sponsored prayer was valid. 
Since the prayers involved in Engel and Abington were during 
school hours and on school property, and were both chosen and 
given by school officials, they were undeniably school-
sponsored prayers. After Engel and Abington, the Court's focus 
shifted from school-sponsored prayer to prayer given at school 
functions, such as graduation. 
Much of the Court's failure to address the constitutionality 
of prayers given at school functions relates to the lower courts' 
use of the test set forth in Lemon. While following Lemon's 
precedent by lower courts was certainly understandable, the 
language in Lemon caused these courts to ask misguided ques-
tions. Instead of looking to Lemon, the lower courts should look 
to Engel as the framework for their decisions. Although Engel 
may not have provided easy answers to all issues, it provided 
the lower courts with a better framework for answering the Es-
tablishment Clause questions raised in Lee and similar cases. 
The discussion that follows first reviews the arguments and 
responses to Engel v. Vital/3 and School District of Abington v. 
Schemp/4 (hereinafter referred to as Abington). This paper 
will then examine the post-Engel graduation cases showing the 
variety of different factual distinctions in the pre-Lee gradua-
tion prayer cases. It will also address the variety of legal ques-
tions raised and the manner in which lower courts answered 
12. "School prayer," a deceptively simple phrase, could connote "prayer during 
school," "prayer in school," or "prayer on school property." These variations of school 
prayer have been addressed to some degree in a number of other cases and are beyond 
the purview of this article. 
13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
14. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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them. This article further suggests that the Lemon test was not 
the best or most appropriate test to use in articulating Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, this article will dem-
onstrate that while the Lee opinion has more ties to Engel than 
Lemon, it nevertheless weakens the standards in Engel. Fi-
nally, unanswered questions by the Lee decision will be ad-
dressed. 
II. SCHOOL PRAYER: A REVIEW OF ENGEL AND ABINGTON 
The Supreme Court decided its first school prayer cases, 
Engel and Abington, only one year apart. These opinions are 
not reliant on the facts involved, but instead focus on the phi-
losophical foundations of the Establishment Clause. Engel 
clearly holds that an official school-sponsored prayer program 
violates the Constitution. 15 However, Abington confuses the 
question of whether the school prayer program at issue is dis-
tinguishable from the official prayer that was invalidated in 
16 Engel. 
A. Engel v. Vital17 
In the 1950s, the State Board of Regents for the State of 
18 New York composed a prayer known as the Regents' prayer, 
and recommended that this prayer be recited in class. 19 Com-
plying with the recommendation, the Board of Education of Un-
ion Free District No. 9 "directed the School District's principal 
to cause the [Regents'] prayer to be said aloud by each class in 
the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day."20 
The trial court modified the policy by ordering that those who 
15. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
16. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 203. Ironically, Justice Brennan's concurrence ex-
ceeds 70 pages in the United States Reporter and yet in one sentence demonstrates the 
simplicity of the Abington case in light of Engel. "Unless Engel v. Vitale is to be over-
ruled, or we are to engage in wholly disingenuous distinction, we cannot sustain these 
practices." Id. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
17. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
18. Id. at 423. The prayer read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents our teachers 
and our Country." I d. 
19. I d. at 422. This prayer was included in the Regents' "Statement on Moral and 
Spiritual Training in the Schools." Id. 
20. I d. at 441. Apparently, teachers lead and joined in the prayer, although that 
is not clearly set out in the majority opinion. ld. (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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objected be relieved from the duty of participation and further, 
that the objectors not be discriminated against in any way. 21 
Without significant discussion of the facts, the Court held 
that the Regents' prayer violated the Establishment Clause, 
"because that prayer was composed by governmental officials 
as part of a governmental program to further religious be-
liefs."22 Where Justice Black did choose to discuss the facts at 
issue, he consistently echoed the concern over governmental 
creation or involvement in prayer. Justice Black noted, for ex-
ample, that the State of New York "encourage[d] recitation of 
the Regents' prayer;"23 that the school board "directed the ... 
princigal to cause the [Regents'] prayer to be said aloud by each 
class;" 4 and that "each separate government in this country 
should stal out of the business of writing or sanctioning official 
prayers."2 Such governmental activities easily infringed upon 
whatever protections were constructed by the Establishment 
Clause. Justice Black further stated that: 
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an es-
tablishment of religion must at least mean that in this coun-
try it is no part of the business of government to compose offi-
cial prayers for any group of the American people to recite as 
part of a religious program carried on by government.26 
He summarized his view by using language akin to that of 
the Establishment Clause, concluding "that New York's state 
prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs em-
bodied in the Regents' prayer."27 
The Court never established a test to determine the validity 
of the New York prayer. Instead, the court found certain facts 
to be of constitutional import. These facts essentially answered 
the constitutional question of whether the J>olicy at issue was 
one that "establishe[d] a religious belief." The Court found 
such an establishment existed and thus did not need to ponder 
the more difficult question of whether the policy was one "re-
specting the Establishment of Religion." 
21. Engle, 370 U.S. at 423-24 n.2. 
22. !d. at 425. 
23. Id. at 424. 
24. ld. at 422. 
25. Id. at 435. 
26. Id. at 425. 
27. Engle, 370 U.S.at 430. 
28. ld. 
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The Court's decision revolved around government actions 
clearly demonstrating governmental support for a particular 
religious belief. Due to his limited use of the facts at hand, Jus-
tice Black did not state which facts were the most significant in 
reaching his outcome, or which facts could be changed without 
a change in the result. 
New York made two arguments in order to avoid a holding 
that the prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The Court 
simply dismissed New York's argument that the prayer was 
constitutionally permissible because it was nondenomina-
tional.29 New York's second argument, which merited, or at 
least earned, more discussion was that the prayer was valid be-
cause the program "[did] not require all pupils to recite the 
prayer but permit[ted] those who wish[ed] to do so to remain 
silent or be excused from the room."30 This argument intimated 
that no one was coerced to pray. The Court summarily rejected 
this argument by stating, "[t]he Establishment Clause ... does 
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compul-
sion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish 
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
non-observing individuals or not."31 No governmental body may 
establish a church or a religion. Put another way, the Court 
held that the Government's constitutional sin is not forgiven 
simply because no one is forced to join in the established relig-
ion; government and religion may not create a voluntary part-
nership.32 The "first and most immediate purpose [of the Estab-
lishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and to 
degrade religion."33 
The Court added that although there was no direct coercion 
29. !d. The Court gave no explanation why it was constitutionally irrelevant that 
the prayer was nondenominational or nonsectarian. The relevance of this issue, how-
ever, has been debated by a number of courts in a variety of different circumstances. 
See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70 of Cleveland County, 766 F.2d 1391, 1403 
(1985) (Under the primary effect prong of the Lemon test "it is irrelevant that a prac-
tice may be nondenominational or non-sectarian ... ");Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 967 (1991) ("The nonsectarian nature of a prayer remains relevant 
to the extent to which a prayer advances religion."). 
30. !d. The issue of coercion was debated by courts in both the graduation prayer 
context as well as other contexts. This issue became central in Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion in Lee. 
31. Engel, 370 U.S. 421, 430. 
32. !d. at 431. 
33. !d. at 431. 
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to join in the prayer, the possibility of indirect coercion was not 
thereby eliminated by the voluntary participation element.34 
According to the Court, "prescribing a particular form of reli-
gious belief' inherently involves coercion of non-observing indi-
viduals.35 Once the government places its "power, prestige and 
financial support" behind a religious belief, the government 
"plain[ly]," albeit indirectly, coerces "religious minorities to con-
form to the prevailing officially approved religion."36 
Justice Douglas concurred with Justice Black's opinion in 
Engel, and although Justice Douglas' concurrence did not spe-
cifically refer to the coercion inherent in government support of 
religion, he did find an inherent violation of the Establishment 
Clause in instances where an~ government funds are used in 
support of religious exercises.3 Justice Douglas stated that the 
issue presented was "an extremely narrow one."38 The question, 
according to Justice Douglas, was whether New York violated 
the Establishment Clause when it financed a religious exer-
cise.39 According to Justice Douglas's analysis, a teacher who 
leads the prayer does so while "on the public payroll" in a "gov-
ernmental institution." Therefore, the state is financing a reli-
gious exercise.40 Any such financin?1 no matter how minuscule, 
violates the Establishment Clause. 
Justice Stewart dissented in Engel, and that dissent is sig-
nificant because of his "choice" discussions that included his 
emphasis on the "voluntariness" of the prayer.42 Justice Stew-
art felt that New York merely "permit[ted, rather than forced] 
school children to say this simple prayer."43 He ignored the 
presence of the teacher and focused instead on the choices 
made by the students to say the prayer. Justice Stewart could 
not "see how an 'official religion' is established by letting those 
34. Id. at 430-31. 
35. ld. at 431. 
36. !d. Of note is that the coercion the court referred to is inherent in the exis-
tence of governmental sponsorship. This is very different from the coercion Justice 
Kennedy referred to in Lee. In Lee, the coercion was the social pressure to attend 
graduation. 
37. ld. at 441 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 439. 
39. ld. 
40. Id. at 441-442. 
41. !d. 
42. !d. at 445. 
43. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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who want to say a prayer say it."44 Over the next three decades, 
courts commonly reviewed this question of student choice and 
its significance within the graduation context. 
In the end, Engel answered this very fact-based constitu-
tional question by prohibiting the creation of any official 
prayers to be said in schools as part of a state prayer program. 
Engel did not define a "state prayer program" nor did it set 
forth a test to determine what the Court would consider a 
"state prayer program." Engel also failed to create a test for de-
termining when or how a prayer becomes an "official prayer." 
However, since each question was answered, the Court perhaps 
may have felt that setting forth such tests was unnecessary. In 
Engel, the state clearly and admittedly defined an "official 
prayer." The state also clearly paid an employee to say a 
prayer. 
In addition, while the Court did not address Justice Stew-
art's voluntariness argument, the Court implicitly rejected it. 
According to the Court's discussion of inherent coercion, it 
would be expected that the government's support of the prayer 
would coerce students to "voluntarily" join the prayer. Addi-
tionally, the Court also explicitly rejected the argument that a 
prayer might be constitutionally valid if it were a "nondenomi-
national" prayer. 
B. School District of Abington v. Schempp 45 
The year after Engel, the Court encountered what should 
have been a very simple school praxer question, at least when 
viewed in light of its predecessor. 6 The facts in Abington v. 
Schempp are merely superficially different from those in Engel. 
Rather than composing a Regents' prayer as New York did in 
Engel, the State in Abington "requir[ed] the selection and read-
ing at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bi-
ble and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in 
unison."47 In other words, the State did not draft the prayer, it 
selected the prayer. As stated by Justice Goldberg in his con-
curring opinion, "[t]hat [the State] has selected, rather than 
44. Id. 
45. 374 U.S. 203. 
46. Id. 
4 7. !d. at 223. Ironically, the prayer in Abington was significantly more religious 
in the traditional sense, as the prayer belonged to an existing religion. 
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written, a particular devotional liturgy seems to me to be with-
out constitutional import."48 The significance was that, once 
again, the State required the saying of religious prayer which, 
viewed in light of Engel, was clearly prohibited. 
The required prayer recitation just as in Engel was also not 
ameliorated by an opt out provision. The Court rejected the ar-
gument that the exercises were permissible because the stu-
49 dents could "absent themselves upon parental request." In re-
jecting the argument, the Court cited Engel,50 holding that the 
Establishment Clause "is violated by the enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion, whether those laws operate 
directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not."51 The fact 
that the government required reading the Bible, even if indi-
viduals could choose not to listen, clearly established a state of-
ficial religious exercise. Just as it had in Engel, the Court re-
jected the notion that an Establishment Clause violation 
turned on coercion. 
The fact that the government required the saying of reli-
gious prayers also necessitated the rejection of the State's ar-
gument. Again focusing on the State's actions, the Court re-
jected the argument that prohibiting the prayer would violate 
the Free Exercise rights of the majority of students who had 
demonstrated their wish to pray.52 What the State's argument 
ignored, and what the Court focused on, was that the students 
did not demonstrate their desire to pray in class until the State 
had mandated prayer. The Court noted that the Free Exercise 
Clause "has never meant that a majorit~ could use the machin-
ery of the State to practice its beliefs." 3 Again, the Court rec-
ognized that where the State requires a religious exercise, that 
exercise is not an individual's exercise protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause, but rather a religious practice established by 
the State. The fact that a majority may consent to that estab-
lishment does not in any way lessen the violation. Indeed, a 
significant purpose of the Bill of Rights is to prevent such con-
sent from being used to eliminate rights of individuals.r,4 The 
48. !d. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
49. !d. at 224-25. 
50. !d. 
51. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
52. Abington, 374 U.S. at 225-26. 
53. !d. at 226. 
54. See Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1948) ("The very 
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State has at least raised a valid Free Exercise question if the 
State refused to prohibit students from spontaneously praying 
before class and without any support or encouragement from 
any employee or agent of the State. Free Exercise does not, 
however, occur when the majority "consents" to the establish-
ment of religion by the State. 
In another effort to distract the Court, the State "insisted 
that unless these religious exercises are permitted a 'religion of 
secularism' is established in the schools."55 Instead of agreeing 
with the State, the Court held that when a State requires reli-
gious exercises, it violates the First Amendment command 
"that the government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding 
nor opposing religion."56 The Court's position was that the 
Court does not establish a "religion of secularism" by prohibit-
ing the State from establishing a religion. 
It is frivolous to argue that the judiciary establishes a "re-
ligion of secularism" whenever it prevents a legislative or ex-
ecutive establishment of religion. Similarly, any effort to dis-
tinguish the facts in Abington from those in Engel would also 
be mundane. The State argued that the Supreme Court erred 
in Engel because it failed to consider its arguments. In particu-
lar, the argument followed that the goal in requiring prayer 
was to provide moral leadership and inspiration to all chil-
dren."57 In essence, the State argued that the prayer had "secu-
lar purposes," including "the promotion of moral values, the 
contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the per-
petuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature.""s 
The Court's first response was that the State had previously 
conceded that the exercise was sectarian. 59 Second, the Court 
noted that The Bible is an "instrument of religion."6° Finally, 
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); Abington, 374 U.S. at 
225 (The religious neutrality of the Religion Clauses, "does not permit a state to re-
quire religious exercises even with the consent of the majority of those affected."); 
Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8'" Cir. 1969) ("The 
very origin of the Bill of Rights draws its history from [the] early concept that even the 
many must give way to certain fundamental rights of the few."). 
55. Abington, 374 U.S. at 225. 
56. !d. 
57. !d. 
58. !d. at 223. 
59. !d. 
60. !d. at 224. 
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the religious character of the exercise is evident because as an 
alternative to reading The King James Bible, the Catholic 
Douay Version could be read. 61 The inescapable conclusion fol-
lowed that the laws at issue "require religious exercises."62 Re-
quiring religious exercises, the Court held, was clearly a 
"breach of neutrality" under the Religion Clauses.63 
The Court's discussion of the State's purposes followed its 
earlier discussion of the test to be applied to evaluate an Estab-
lishment Clause claim: "What is the purpose and primary effect 
of the enactment?"64 The Court then restated the question in a 
form which later became two-thirds of the Lemon v. Kurtzman 
test, holding "that to withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose 
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion. ,G5 The Court failed to discuss the application of the test, or 
the meaning of the words used in its test. Rather than suggest 
how the test was to be applied, the Court discussed the State's 
argument as to its purpose, but did not really tie the test to the 
discussion. 
The State argued that it had a purpose to promote values. 
Rather than hold that the subjective desire of the State was ir-
relevant, the Court engaged in constitutional fact-finding. It 
found that based on the facts surrounding the prayer, the State 
did not, in fact, have a secular purpose.66 
This discussion of purpose clouded an otherwise simple 
case. In both Abington and Engel the State demanded that 
school children say a prayer. Perhaps looking at it in a more 
favorable light due to opt-outs, it could be said that the State 
chose prayer as its preferred speech. Once it had been deter-
mined that prayer was preferred speech, establishment in vio-
lation of the First Amendment was demonstrated. Engel took 
this approach. While the court in Abington discussed the prob-
lem in a similar way, it diverted attention from the approach 
by enveloping the discussion into its analysis of purpose. The 
Court further diverted focus by its approach to the State's pur-
61. Id. 
62. ld. 
63. Id. at 225. 
64. Id. at 222. 
65. Id. For the first time in the context of an Establishment Clause case, the 
Court uses the term "test." 
66. Id. at 224. 
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pose argument. Rather than hold that purpose was irrelevant 
when the State adopted a policy to say a prayer, the Court de-
termined that the State could not have had the purpose 
claimed. 
About a decade after Abington, the Supreme Court decided 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 67 cementing into Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence the questions of purpose and effect. 68 The Lemon 
case added as part of the specific test the question of entangle-
ment.69 Because of Lemon, the straightforward approach to the 
Establishment Clause taken in Engel was abandoned by most 
of the graduation prayer cases to be decided between Engel and 
Lee. 
III. GRADUATION PRAYER, FROM ENGEL TO LEE 
A. Early Post-Engel! Pre-Lee Graduation Prayer Cases 
1. Wood v. Lebanon Township School District70 
The first post-Engel71 case to review the validity of a 
graduation prayer expressly distinguished Engel. It concluded 
that the graduation prayer at issue did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. 72 The district court made two significant dis-
tinctions from Engel and Abington. First, contrary to the im-
plicit coercion argument articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Engel and Abington, the district court held that no coercion 
element was present there; that is, no one was required to at-
tend the graduation ceremony in order to receive a diploma. In 
this distinction, the district court recognized that "the Estab-
lishment Clause [may be] violated even though there is no di-
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 612-13. 
70. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
71. In 1964, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the constitutional-
ity of a religious baccalaureate program conducted by Florida Schools, but chose not to 
do so for procedural reasons. Chamberlin v. Dade County, Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 
U.S. 402 (1964). 
72. Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1293. The courts did not discuss who invited the clergy, 
or what the clergy was told to say. The court simply noted that a member of the clergy, 
not paid by the school, intended to give both an invocation and benediction. 
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rect government compulsion,"73 but nevertheless distinguished 
the prayer in Engel from the graduation prayer here, by ra-
tionalizing that the Engel prayer "was thrust upon students 
through the use of the public school system." 74 
The lack of compulsion to attend supported the court's sec-
ond distinction from Engel. The court concluded that the 
graduation Rrayer was not invalid because it was not an "offi-
cial prayer."75 First, because no one was compelled to attend, 
the ceremony was "stripped" of "any semblance of governmen-
tal establishment or condemnation."76 Second, the prayer was 
not considered an "official prayer" because a clergy member 
was proffering it. 77 Finally, the court noted that at the time the 
suit was filed, it was uncertain what the prayer's content would 
be. 7H Therefore, if the government did not know what was to be 
said, the government could not be the sponsor. 79 
In support of it's finding, the district court also compared 
the graduation prayer to some traditional rituals, which at 
least appeared to be allowable under the Establishment 
Clause. The court cited Justice Douglas's concurrence in Engel 
for support, which it believed to signify approval for opening 
prayers in the Supreme Court, the United States Senate, and 
the United States House of Representatives.8° Finally, almost 
73. !d. at 1295. 
74. !d. While the district court did not make its point clearly, it held that Engel 
was different as the students were compelled to attend classes where the "voluntary" 
prayers were said. In the case under review, the students were not even compelled to 
attend the ceremony. 
75. !d. at 1294. 
76. !d. at 1295. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. at 1294. 
79. !d. For purposes of this paper, the logic of the analysis is not of significance. 
Each of these lower court opinions is significant for the issues raised, the approaches 
taken and the results given. The point of the article is to show the variety of issues 
raised by prayer at graduation and how the Supreme Court ultimately ducked them. 
80. !d. As it turns out, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of prayer 
before the Nebraska State Legislature. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
Almost certainly the same prayer would be upheld in the United States Senate and the 
United States House of Representatives. On the other hand, the transfer from legisla-
tive prayer to graduation prayer is not easily acceptable. The Supreme Court ulti-
mately rejected such an analogy in Lee. This argument is also akin to the "ceremonial 
deism" argument used in other contexts. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)("! would suggest that such practices 
as the designation of'ln God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God 
contained in the Pledge of Allegiance can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt 
phrase, as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny 
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as an afterthought, the district court looked at the purpose of 
the government's action and held that even if there were some 
religiosity, "the ceremony to be held is primarily secular."81 
2. Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District82 
Two years later, in Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District, the 
purpose and effect tests (the first two prongs from the Lemon 
test) became the focus of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
decision upholding the constitutionality of essentially the same 
graduation prayers in the same school district sued in Wood. 83 
Although the court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of 
the policy, no more than three justices agreed upon any one 
approach. Virtually all arguments made had also been made 
previously by the district court in Wood. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, as did the court in Wood, first found "that atten-
dance at the graduation ceremonies was purely voluntary" and 
that the plaintiffs would not be coerced into violating their reli-
gious beliefs.84 The plurality then concluded that because the 
graduation was a "public ritual," "the purpose or primary effect 
of the resolution providing for an invocation and benediction" 
was not to advance religion. 85 The court did not explain why 
public religious rituals did not violate the Establishment 
Clause; rather, it simply found that public rituals did not have 
the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.86 
While the plurality did not rely on Lemon, it did rely on 
Abington.87 One concurrence made extensive efforts to distin-
guish Abington.88 The concurrence found that the graduation 
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious con-
tent."'). Essentially, "ceremonial deism" refers to deity references made so often that the 
religious meaning has been destroyed. For an interesting discussion of why "ceremonial 
deism" makes no sense, see Judge Manion's concurring opinion in Sherman v. Commu-
nity Canso!. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, 
J., concurring). 
81. ld. While the court did not cite to Abington or Lemon as to the basis for con-
sidering purpose, its purpose analysis is substantially similar to that made by courts 
that apply the purpose prong of the Lemon test. 
82. 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 365. 
85. Id. at 366. 
86. ld. at 365-66. 
87. ld. at 365. 
88. Id. at 368-69 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). The other concurring opinions esse:J.-
tially determined that the case was not ripe because it was not certain what exactly 
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prayer was constitutionally distinguishable as it was a one-
time occurrence, and not part of the curriculum or the normal 
routine of school.'~9 Essentially the concurrence found that if 
there was a violation it was of "de minim us stature" [sic]. 90 
3. Grossberg v. Deusebio91 
The third and last of the early graduation prayer cases, 
Grossberg v. Deusebio, presented the first significant factual 
distinction.~):< In this case, the school officials did not make the 
decision to have a graduation prayer, instead the decision was 
made by class representatives who acted on behalf of the senior 
class. 9' Graduating classes had made this same decision in 
previous years. Furthermore, the entire cost of the graduation, 
except the cost of the diplomas, was borne by the senior class. 94 
As the court characterized it, the State attempted a symbolic 
washing of hands.95 However, the district court rejected the 
idea that school officials could purge themselves "of their re-
sponsibility."96 This responsibility was apparently tied to the 
court's earlier statement oflaw: "[a] graduation ceremony for a 
public school class, held on public school grounds, and adminis-
tered by public school personnel, at which diplomas are offi-
cially awarded by the administration, is a public school 
event."97 
Despite the facts that appear to imply that the students 
could choose not to have a graduation, the court held that 
graduations are and must be school events.98 The court did not 
provide any evidence that the school somehow controlled the 
decisions made by the students. Its rationale was that all deci-
sions related to school events were ultimately school decisions. 
would be said at graduation. 
89. !d. at 369. 
90. !d. AB with many of the graduation prayer cases, this opinion seemingly omits 
clear delineation of purpose or effect. 
91. Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E. D. Va. 1974). 
92. !d. 
93. !d. at 287. Plainly stated, the decision of whether or not to have prayer at 
graduation was not made by the school board, principal, teacher or any other person 
employed by the school. 
94. !d. 
95. !d. at 288. 
96. !d. 
97. !d. 
98. !d. 
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Thus, students who made the decision to hold a graduation 
prayer acted on behalf of or as agents for the school. 
Surprisingly, after holding that the school was responsible 
for the graduation, the court concluded that the prayer said at 
graduation did not violate the Establishment Clause.99 The 
court, although it did not specifically cite to Lemon, based its 
decision on its three-pronged test. As to effect, the court was 
"not convinced that the primary effect of the invocation will be 
either doctrinal dissemination or a manifestation of govern-
mental affinity for religion."100 This conclusion was based on 
the commonplace nature of invocations throughout our his-
t 
101 d t· 11 d . . . . I . 102 ory an , essen 1a y, a e mmLmus InJury ana ys1s. 
As for purpose, the court looked at the purpose for having 
graduation, not the purpose for having a prayer at gradua-
tion.103 Once the court viewed the question of the ceremony's 
purpose, it was easy to conclude that the ceremony's primary 
purpose did not advance or inhibit religion. The primary pur-
pose of graduation is both ceremonial and to "award ... honors 
and diplomas."104 
The court did not specifically discuss entanglement, but in a 
conclusory manner held that the school board was not "so en-
meshed in religious affairs as to warrant this Court's interven-
tion."105 Throughout the opinion, the court downpl~ed the 
length of the prayer, calling the time a "few moments" 06 and a 
"brief period."107 Apparently, the brevity gave the court suffi-
cient reason to find no significant "enmeshment." While the 
court did not use the language, it essentially called the viola-
tion de minimus, just as some of the state court justices did in 
Wiest. 
In each of these three early cases, the courts found gradua-
tion prayer constitutionally permissible. The holdings were all 
based on either explicit or implicit efforts to find constitutional 
significance to factual differences between graduation prayer 
99. Id. at 290. 
100. I d. 
101. ld. at 289. 
102. I d. at 289. 
103. I d. 
104. I d. 
105. Id. at 290. 
106. Id. at 289. 
107. Id. at 290. 
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and a school's prayer declared invalid in Engel and Abington. 
The facts that arguably make a constitutional difference are: 
( 1) the government does not require attendance at graduation; 
(2) graduation is a one time event; (3) prayer is not said by an 
employee of the state; (4) students voted to have a graduation; 
and (5) students voted to have a prayer. 
These factual distinctions provided the foundation for a va-
riety of legal arguments over the next two decades. Very few 
new arguments would be made, and most would likely focus on 
these factual differences. One major permutation of graduation 
prayer not discussed in the very early cases is prayer offered by 
108 
a student. 
B. Later Post-Engel I Pre-Lee Graduation Cases 
Although there were no more reported graduation prayer 
cases during the 1970s, there were related cases addressing the 
meshing of religion and education. For example, in 197 4 the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin enjoined 
holding a graduation at a Roman Catholic Church.109 A year 
earlier the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to baccalaureate 
services finding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven a 
violation with their stipulation. 110 Not until 1982, twenty years 
after Engel, did a court hold that graduation prayer violated 
the Establishment Clause. 111 
1. Doe v. Aldine Independent School District112 
The first graduation prayer decision to specifically apply 
the Lemon test was Doe v. Aldine Independent School District. 
The Doe case is significantly different from most of the pre-Lee 
108. Student prayer decisions are the source for many of the post-Lee high school 
graduation prayer cases. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'! 
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en bane); Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. 
Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); Gearon v. Loudon 
County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
109. Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
110. Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. Ark. 1973). Plain-
tiffs stipulated to the existence of baccalaureate services. While plaintiffs almost cer-
tainly assumed the court would take judicial notice of the religious nature of the ser-
vices, the court instead demanded proof of what would be said. I d. 
111. Doe v. Aldine Independent School District, 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 
112. Id. 
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graduation prayer cases because it involved singing a school 
prayer at all extra-curricular school events, including gradua-
tion. Regularly, the principal, or another school official would 
initiate the singing or recitation of the prayer. 113 No one was 
required to participate. 114 In defending the policy, the govern-
ment relied on the Lemon test to argue that the prayer had 
"the clear secular purpose of instilling 'in the students a sense 
of school spirit or pride ... [which] has a beneficial effect on the 
student body and contributes to an increase in morale, and 
concomitantly lessens disciplinary problems'."115 The court, re-
lying on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Abington,116 noted 
that "when a non-religious purpose may be promoted throu~h 
non-religious means, a state may not employ religious ones." 17 
Whenever a purpose can be achieved through nonreligious 
means and religious means were used, the court concluded, 
that the original purgose is religious and in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. 18 This holding eliminates many govern-
mental actions that previously have been upheld by the Su-
preme Court. For example, a creche or a Menorah (or other 
religious symbol) could never be placed on public property pur-
suant to the lower court's holding. 119 Indeed, this holding would 
eliminate all religious art in public museums. Technically, if 
the objective of a museum is to elevate the human spirit, that 
objective can be achieved without displaying religious art. This 
rationale, is typical of that used by the courts declaring 
graduation prayer invalid. Courts cite to Justice Brennan's 
Abington opinion and hold that anything able to be accom-
plished with a prayer could be accomplished without one. 
With regard to effect, the court again followed Engel hold-
ing that "voluntariness is not relevant to a first amendment in-
quiry."120 The court noted that both the principal and the choir 
113. Id. at 885. 
114. I d. at 884-85. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to find a case after the early 
1960s in which the government has defended a government decision to directly compel 
recitation of a prayer. Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Engel 
and Abington that coercion is irrelevant, governments have defended (and after Lee 
continue to defend) prayer because no one is coerced into participating. 
115. I d. at 886. 
116. Abington, 374 U.S. at 280-281 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
117. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 886. 
118. Id. 
119. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
120. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 887. 
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director often initiated recitations or singing the school 
prayer. 121 In addition, the recitation took place at school events 
on school property. These events were "an integral part of the 
school's extracurricular program and as such provide a power-
ful incentive for students to attend."122 The combined effect of 
these factors demonstrates that the impact of the school's ac-
tivities "might create in a student's mind the impression that 
the State's attitude toward religion lacks neutrality."123 The 
conclusion was clear to the court that the State's primary pur-
pose was to advance religion. 
In Doe v. Aldine, the court's application of the effect test 
most closely parallels the Supreme Court's Engel decision. Had 
it not been for Lemon, the court could have cited Engel and 
concluded that the school had, based on the facts clearly dem-
onstrated, established prayer as a State-sponsored activity. In-
deed, the only factual difference between Engel and Doe was 
that the "voluntary" prayer was said only during "voluntary" 
activities, and in Engel the "voluntary" prayer was said during 
required activities. Nothing in Engel indicates that this distinc-
tion serves any constitutional purpose. 
The Court stated that the school officials' supervision over 
the singing and praying constituted entanglement. 124 Since the 
prayer occurred on supervised school property there was exces-
sive entanglement. In so concluding, the court relied on Lub-
bock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School Dis-
trict125 which was overruled by Board of Education v 
Mergens, 126 and more recently by Agostini v. Felton. 121 Finally, 
the court rejected the claims that students had Free Exercise 
rights by noting that the activity was "not an independent, un-
official invocation of God's help by the students, but was rather 
an initiated, encouraged, and supervised regular practice that 
occurs on school property during extracurricular events as part 
128 
of the school's program." 
121. Id. 
122. !d. This approach very much mirrors the Supreme Court's discussion in Engel 
of the inherent coerciveness of government-sponsored prayer. The Supreme Court's co-
ercion discussion in Lee is also quite similar. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.1982). 
126. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
127. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
128. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 888. This argument parallels Abington. There is no claim 
130 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
2. Graham v. Central Community School District of Decater 
129 County 
In Graham, a minister "conduct[ed] the invocation and 
benediction" and had "complete control" over the content of the 
messages. 130 While the court was not certain what would be 
said, every previous benediction and invocation before the 
court's decision had been Christian. 131 The court assumed that 
the benediction and invocation would be religious in nature. 
The court nominally applied the Lemon test, and held that 
the purpose of a prayer at graduation was religious because 
prayer, by its nature, is religious. The court also determined 
that the effect of prayer is to advance religion because the ap-
parent purpose of prayer is to advance religion. 132 The court did 
not consider entanglement. 133 
The essential assumption made by the coure34 was that the 
prayer belonged to the school. Once that assumption was made, 
the court narrowed its focus to the prayer itself, rather than 
the function of graduation. As virtually every school does in at-
tempting to defend graduation prayer, Decater County asserted 
that graduation had a laudable purpose, which the prayer as-
sisted in achieving. 135 The court ignored this argument and an-
swered the simple question concerning what the purpose of re-
ligious prayer really was. This became the typical approach to 
the problem over the next few years. 
C. The Last Six Years Before Lee 
From 1986 through 1990, nine courts reviewed graduation 
prayers, 136 and the only two decisions upholding graduation 
to free choice and Free Exercise after the government has already established the 
prayer as preferred by the government. 
129. 608 F.Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 535-536. 
133. Id. at 536. The court also rejected the argument that the students had a Free 
Exercise right to pray and that this right would be infringed upon by prohibiting 
prayer at graduation. 
134. This is not to suggest that the assumption was incorrect or should not have 
been made. 
135. Id. at 534. 
136. Kay,719 P.2d at 875; Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Bennett, 238 Cal. Rptr. At 
819; Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 331; Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68; Sands I, 262 Cal. 
Rptr. at 452. 
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137 138 prayer were reversed. In the final year and a half before 
Lee, another seven graduation prayer cases were decided. 139 In 
three out of those seven, the courts upheld the graduation 
prayer.140 In Sands II, the California Supreme Court voted 5-2 
with six opinions, only three of which clearly argued that 
graduation prayer was always invalid. 141 In Weisman and 
Weisman II, the lower courts declared graduation prayer inva-
lid.142 In the seventh decision, the lower court held that prayer 
at graduation was always invalid. Eventually, the circuit court 
sent the case back for a determination of whether the gradua-
tion ceremony might be considered a limited public forum, 
which fact might permit prayer. 143 
While these courts disagreed over the validity of graduation 
prayer, they agreed on the proper test, each applying the 
Lemon test. For the most part these courts also agreed on the 
proper way to apply the Lemon test. The outcomes were often 
different, due to the variety of facts involved in each case. Lee 
reflected one fact pattern the courts uniformly agreed was in-
valid. In Lee-type cases, the school, through its principal or 
school board, invited a minister to give a prayer, invariably re-
ferred to as an invocation or benediction, at graduation. Noun-
appealed decision of any court after 1980, upheld the constitu-
tionality of graduation prayer under those circumstances. 
1. Weisman v. Lee I & II 
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the trial 
court in Lee, declared graduation prayers given by an invited 
minister invalid after applying the second prong of the Lemon 
test. 144 The court held that the policy had an effect of advancing 
religion. 145 As that finding alone invalidated the policy, the 
137. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Sands I, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 452. 
138. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406; Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809. 
139. Sands Il, 809 P.2d at 809; Albright v. Bd.of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. 765 F. 
Supp. 692 (D. Utah 1991); Griffin v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, (D. Kan. 1992); Jones I, 
930 F.2d at 416; Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 98; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1990; Brody v. 
Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992). 
140. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 416; Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 692; Griffin, 794 F. Supp. 
at 1054. 
141. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809. 
142. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 98; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1990. 
143. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1108. 
144. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68. 
145. Id. at 72. 
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court did not consider the first or third prongs. According to the 
court, "a state action advances or inhibits religion," when "the 
action creates an identification of the state with a religion, or 
with religion in general."146 Without explaining its rationale, 
the court simply concluded that "the benediction and invocation 
advance religion by creating an identification of school with a 
deity, and therefore religion."147 Far from being a "pellucid 
opinion" as suggested by the circuit court on review/48 the dis-
trict court simply determined that prayer added to school plus 
an important occasion equates a "symbolic union" of church 
and state. 149 The court further held that another method to 
conclude whether the government creates an unconstitutional 
effect is to determine whether the governmental action en-
dorses religion. 150 According to the court in Weisman I, the 
school "in effect endorsed religion by authorizin§" an appeal to a 
deity in public school graduation ceremonies." 51 A prayer at 
graduation conveys a preference for religion which, in effect, 
endorses religion. Interestingly, at the conclusion of the opin-
ion, the court turned back to Engel stating, "if students cannot 
be led in prayer on all of those other days, prayer on gradua-
t . d . I . . t ,rsz wn ay IS a so mappropna e ... 
In addition to reviewing the Lemon test, the district court 
rejected the defense made by the school that the prayers were 
permissible under Marsh v. Chambers. 153 According to the dis-
trict court, "[t]he Marsh holding was narrowly limited to the 
unique situation of legislative prayer."154 This approach to 
Marsh is one typically taken by those courts holding that 
graduation prayer violates the Establishment Clause. 
On appeal, the First Circuit adopted the trial court's opin-
ion. One judge added a concurring opinion applying the first 
146. !d. at 71. 
147. !d. at 72. 
148. Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1090. 
149. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 72. Under this simple formulation, a moment of 
silence by anyone, whether or not speaking at the ceremony, would also violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. While this is not likely what the court meant, this certainly falls 
within the words used. 
150. !d. 
151. !d. 
152. !d. at 74. 
153. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
154. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 74. 
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and third prongs of the Lemon test, 155 and yet another dis-
sented.156 In applying the purpose test, the concurring judge es-
sentially held that prayer could only have a religious pur-
pose. 157 As for entanglement, the concurring judge found that 
because the school suggested the tlpe of prayer, the school en-
gaged in excessive entanglement.15 
2. Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Districe59 
The analysis of each part of the Lemon test in Lee I and Lee 
II is similar to the analysis in prior graduation prayer cases. 
Two California courts of appeal came to opposite conclusions on 
the validity of graduation prayer. In Bennett v. Livermore Uni-
fied School District, the court provided a superficial analysis of 
Lemon and graduation prayer. To the court, quite simp~, "the 
primary purpose of a religious invocation is religious."1 0 Both 
the purpose and effect of the court's analysis were essentially 
tautological, e.g., "[t]he practice of including a religious invoca-
tion in a graduation ceremony conveys a message of endorse-
ment of the particular creed represented in the invocation, and 
of religion in general."161 Per the issue of entanglement, the 
court attacks a common problem with graduation prayers. As 
in Lee, school officials would allow 
prayer/invocations/benedictions only if they were non-
sectarian. In order to prevent sectarian prayers, the school had 
to monitor these prayers, thereb~i according to the court, en-
tangling the school with religion.1 
In Bennett, the decision to include a religious invocation 
was made by the high school's graduation committee. 163 To the 
Bennett court, how the prayer came to be included in the cere-
155. Weisman II, 908 F. 2d at 1094-1095 (Bownes, J., concurring). 
156. Id. at 1097 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
157. Id. at 1095 (Bownes, J., concurring). This approach is typical. A prayer has 
obvious religious purpose. Once the judge looks to the "effect" of prayer, it is virtually 
inevitable that the judge would conclude that the effect is religious. 
158. Id. 
159. 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987). 
160. I d. at 823. 
161. I d. at 823-824. 
162. I d. The school admitted and the court agreed that if any prayer were allowed, 
it would be "necessary to oversee the student's choice of ceremony to ensure" that the 
ceremony remained nonsectarian. 
163. I d. at 821. The makeup of the committee is not clear. However, from the way 
the opinion is written, it appears to be a committee of students. 
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mony was irrelevant. The court found the ceremony to be an 
"administrative act" as a matter of fact and law. 164 It easily fol-
lowed from this finding that the marriage of religion and an 
administrative act violated the Establishment Clause. 
3. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District (Sands 1)165 
In the second California case, Sands I, a number of differ-
ent methods for selecting speakers was at issue. In one case the 
class president selected the speakers, but the principal made 
the final decision. In another, a student committee selected the 
speakers. 166 Before applying the Lemon test, the court noted 
the widely divergent results in graduation prayer cases. 
As to purpose, the Sands I court disagreed with the Bennett 
court's tautological conclusion that prayer is religious and 
therefore the purpose is religious. The court noted that "to 
'[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity 
would inevitably lead to its invalidation ... "'167 
The correct question, the court asserted, is "whether the re-
ligious activity is being used for a secular purpose."168 A secular 
purpose need not be exclusive and can be joined with a reli-
gious purpose. 169 The proper view of a graduation prayer is in 
the context ofthe~aduation ceremony, the purpose ofwhich is 
"wholly secular."1 This, the court implied, is analogous to the 
Supreme Court's decision in County of Allegheny171 where the 
Supreme Court looked at the "context" of the religious symbols 
on public property to determine whether their presence vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. 172 The invocation in context of 
the entire ceremony simply "sets a formal or solemn tone."173 
The conclusion was that the prayer, therefore, served a secular 
164. ld. 
165. 262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989). 
166. Id. at 454-55. 
167. !d. at 459 (quoting from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)). 
168. !d. 
169. ld. 
170. !d. 
171. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
172. It is interesting to note how similar this context "test" is to the obscenity test 
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), wherein the court suggests that the question 
as to whether a work is obscene is not the import of a passage or photo taken out of 
context but the work "taken as a whole." 
173. Sands I, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
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purpose of adding "dignity and decorum."174 
As to effect, the Sands I court again considered the prayer 
in context. The effect of the prayer mirrored the purpose. The 
effect was to "set a solemn tone" and any religious effect was 
"remote and incidental."175 Important to the court was that the 
graduation prayer was a one-time occurrence. It "did not con-
cur in a 'repetitive or pedagogical context7' and was not part of 
a program of 'calculated indoctrination'."1 6 The court based its 
conclusion of such excessive governmental entanglement on es-
sentially these same factors. 
Curiously, the court concluded its Establishment Clause 
analysis by "emphasiz[ing] that we find onl~ nonsectarian in-
vocations and benedictions constitutional." 77 The court pro-
vided no clarification as to why the statement was accurate or 
made sense. There is little logic to holding that "prayer" which 
offends the atheist is valid but that prayer that offends a per-
son of another sect is not. 178 
4. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District (Sands 11)179 
Sands II reversed Sands I. In Sands II, the California Su-
preme Court essentially agreed with the lower court, holding 
that a state must be "certain" that no one "advance the reli-
gious mission of his or her churches in the public school set-
ting."180 Interestingly enough, the court of appeals' require-
ment, with which the California Supreme Court agreed, 
provided part of the basis for the California Supreme Court's 
decision to reverse Sands I. The court in Sands II reasoned 
that the only way to assure that a prayer is acceptable, i.e., 
nonsectarian, would be for the government/school to evaluate 
174. Id. 
175. I d. at 461. 
176. Id. (quoting from Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. at 288-89 (E.D. Va. 
1974)). While not expressly distinguishing graduation prayer from school prayer in 
Engel, the court is, in effect, making that distinction. 
177. Id. 
178. In spirit, this holding is akin to the Bennett holding that even if prayer were 
allowed, entanglement would follow in order to keep the prayer from favoring one sect. 
179. 809 P. 2d 809 (1991). 
180. Id. at 818 (quoting from Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410-11 (internal quo-
tations omitted)). The court softened this overly broad statement, implying, by refer-
ence to the Supreme Court's decision in Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), that it may be permissible under some circumstances for 
students to advance a religious mission among each other. 
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the content of admittedly religious speech. 181 This monitoring 
was precisely the type of entanglement prohibited by the Es-
tablishment Clause. "To allow preventive monitoring by the 
state of the content of religious speech inevitably leads to grad-
ual official development of what is acceptable public prayer."182 
The California Supreme Court thus concluded that the gradua-
tion prayers at issue violated the entanglement prong of the 
Lemon test. 183 
The Sands II court also held that the graduation prayers 
violated the effect prong of the Lemon test. 184 This conclusion 
was based upon the fact that graduation is a school event. 185 
The court stated that "when a religious invocation is given via 
a sound system controlled by school principals and the religious 
invocation occurs at a school-sponsored event at a school-owned 
facility, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious invoca-
tion conveys a message that the school endorses the religious 
invocation."186 According to the opinion, "inclusion of gradua-
tion prayers in an official ceremony" signifies approval of both 
"the practice of prayer and the prayer's religious content. The 
message of sponsorship is unavoidable."187 Put another way, 
prayer at lraduation "produces a 'symbolic union' of state and 
religion."1 Again, graduation plus prayer equals Establish-
ment Clause violation. According to the court, the conclusion is 
inescapable that prayer at graduation has the effect of advanc-
ing religion and therefore violates the second prong of the 
Lemon test. 
The plurality's analysis of the Lemon test does not rely on 
the school's promotion of the religious ceremonies. Instead, the 
plurality's opinion is in the passive tense. Without stating who 
was responsible for the prayers being said at graduation, the 
court stated that the effect of prayer plus graduation violates 
the Establishment Clause. This approach can be distinguished 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Again, this is a typical but illogical approach. Prayer is prayer whether it spe-
cifically is sectarian or not. 
184. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 813. 
185. Id. at 814-15. 
186. ld. at 815 (quoting from Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 
831, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989)). 
187. ld. at 814 n. 5. 
188. Id. at 815 (quoting from Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 
(1985)). 
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from the plurality's rejection of the State's argument that it 
1 d t . 1" . 189 was mere y accommo a mg re 1g10n. 
The plurality noted, "[t]here is no free exercise right for 
government officials to include prayers in a public school cere-
mony."190 The plurality distinguished student speech recogniz-
ing that "in this case school officials do promote, lead, and par-
ticipate in the religious ceremonies ... "191 The government 
officials, as the plurality notes, were active participants in 
assuring the presence of prayer. Prayer did not find its way 
into the ceremonies all by itself. Although the plurality's 
discussion of the Lemon test does not in anyway make this 
clear, the question of whether graduation could be or is a public 
forum was explicitly discussed. 
5. Lundberg v. West Monona Community School Districe92 
For reasons similar to those given by both the Sands II plu-
rality and the Weisman I and II courts, the federal district 
court, in Lundberg v. West Monona Community School District, 
rejected a claim that a school board should be required to allow 
a minister to speak at graduation. 193 The Lundberg court held 
that allowing an invocation or benediction would violate the 
purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test. Therefore, the 
court would not order the school board to allow a minister to 
give a prayer. 194 The significance of Lundberg lies not in the 
court's decision, but in the arguments raised by the plaintiffs. 
The students in Lundberg argued that graduation is a public 
forum and therefore the government could not discriminate 
against religious speech.195 While not using the term, the court 
essentially found graduation to be a type of non-public forum 
where "speech is subject to the greatest amount of government 
restrictions."196 Relying on Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier, 197 the court concluded that the school had simply and 
189. The plurality also rejected the state's argument based on Marsh v. Chambers. 
See Sands II, 809 P.2d at 819-20. 
190. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 816. 
191. ld. at n.7. 
192. 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989). 
193. ld. 
194. ld. at 342-45. 
195. I d. at 336. 
196. ld. at 337. 
197. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Supreme Court found that a school did not possess 
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validly "banned certain subject matter from graduation cere-
monies (i.e., religion) believing such a subject is inappropriate 
t h l t . 't ,198 a a sc oo ac IVI y. 
As to whether the school could create a public forum 
wherein religious speech would be permissible, the court was 
contradictory. The court held "that while the school could have, 
it did not create the graduation ceremony 'for the purpose of 
providing a forum for expressive activity'."199 The court noted 
earlier that graduation prayer must always be a non-public fo-
rum. While the court did not use the word "always," its ration-
ale at first blush appears to indicate such: 
The court finds that a high school graduation ceremony falls 
within the third forum, that in which the public's right to free 
speech is subject to the greatest amount of government re-
strictions. The evidence at the hearing established that the 
West Monona Community School District organizes, author-
izes, and sponsors the Onawa High School commencement 
program. The event is conducted on school property using 
school facilities, which event school employees carry out. The 
school sets the program for the commencement ceremony, 
having the sole discretion to dictate its content. While the 
school cannot dictate the actual words spoken, the school does 
retain control over the type of speech admissible at the cere-2oo 
mony. 
The court then concluded: "It is altogether fitting and 
proper that the school have the power to control what occurs at 
d t . f 't . ,201 a gra ua wn o 1 s semors. 
While these comments appear to foreclose the possibility of 
the creation of a public forum at graduation, they must be 
taken in the context of the case presented. The plaintiffs in 
Lundberg were comprised of students and a minister who were 
asking the court "to force the School Board to provide a stage 
upon which plaintiffs may express their views concerning relig-
all the attributes of a traditional public forum. For example, the school did not violate 
the First Amendment by its failure to print two pages in the school newspaper that in-
cluded the names of two students involved in a controversial issue. It was not unrea-
sonable because of the need to protect the privacy of the individuals in the article. ld. 
198. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 338. 
199. Id. at 337 (quoting Correlius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 
u.s. 778, 805C1985n. 
200. !d. at 337. 
201. Id. 
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ion."202 In light of the law concerning a public forum, it is cer-
tainly an unremarkable conclusion that a school (the state) 
cannot be required to create a public forum. 203 The court's con-
clusion that a school ceremony is not a public forum unless the 
school wants it to be is also unremarkable. 204 
The Lundberg case is interesting, however, because of the 
plaintiffs efforts to prove the existence of a public forum and 
because of the court's conclusion. As mentioned, the court ap-
pears to conclude that a public forum could be created, but then 
uses words that appear to foreclose the possibility. Also, the 
court assumed without any significant discussion that "[e]ven if 
the court were to hold that a high school graduation ceremony 
constitutes a public forum, the School Board would still have 
the right to ban prayer at the graduation ceremony because it 
has a compelling state interest in not violating the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment."205 The idea that the 
government can easily and at any time prohibit religious 
speech at a public forum has been soundly rejected. 206 The court 
secondly concludes that if permitted, the speech which ~lain­
tiffs claim a right to exercise would be school-sponsored." 07 Al-
though this conclusion has not been soundly rejected, it does 
appear to prohibit any effort to show how one graduation might 
be different from another. This is also shown by the court's 
third conclusion, "[g]raduation ceremonies have never served 
as forums for public debate or discussions, or as a forum 
through which to allow varying groups to voice their views. 
Schools hold graduation ceremonies for the very limited secular 
purposes-to congratulate graduates of the high school."208 
These conclusions demonstrate that the court found that all 
graduations are indistinguishable. In sum, the court held that 
schools could possibly create a public forum at graduation but 
202. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted). 
203. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) 
("The government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permit-
ting limited discourse ... "). 
204. Id. 
205. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339 n.8. 
206. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 
(1995). This is not to say that the State may not ever have grounds to reject religious 
speech in a public forum. It cannot be simply concluded that religious speech may be 
rejected because of the fear of an Establishment Clause violation. 
207. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339 n.7. 
208. Id. at 339. 
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that all graduations are the same. The court added that the 
Lundberg graduation was not a public forum, so it can be con-
cluded that graduations can never be public forums. These 
holdings were all made under circumstances when it was clear 
that the school did not want to nor attempt to grant students 
(or any one else) a freedom to speak. As it turned out, 
Lundberg dealt only very superficially with the Establishment 
Clause. 
6. Griffith v. Teran 209 
The question of student speech and the creation (or not) of a 
forum in relation to the Establishment Clause was more seri-
ously considered in those cases where the school did grant 
speech rights to students. 
For example, in Griffith v Teran, 210 students were selected 
to speak at graduation by school officials from "a diverse cross-
section of the student body" and "without regard to religious 
beliefs or preferences."211 The court did not clearly explain how 
students were selected, but those selected were "counseled only 
to speak in non-sectarian, non-doctrinal, and non-proselytizing 
terms."212 Furthermore, an atheistic or agnostic point of view 
would "be consistent with the purpose of these portions of the 
graduation program."213 The court found this program to be 
consistent with all three prongs of the Lemon test: (1) The pur-
pose of the invocations was to solemnize the occasion; (2) The 
primary effect of these invocations is not to endorse religion, 
because invocations at public ceremonies have "passed into 'the 
American civil religion';"214 and (3) There is no "excessive en-
tanglement," where the students composed the prayer subject 
only to a review by the principal for sectarianism or proselyti-
zation."215 
As to the purpose prong, the court focused on the purpose of 
the invocation and not the graduation ceremony. However, as 
to purpose, the court emphasized one of the most confusing as-
209. 794 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992). 
210. !d. 
211. Id. at 1055. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 1056. 
214. I d. at 1059, (quoting Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1409). 
215. Jd. 
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pects of the Lemon purpose prong. 216 "The first prong of the 
Lemon test ... requires that state action have 'a' secular gur-
pose. It does not require that the purpose be only secular."2 7 
In this case it was easy for the court to conclude that a 
secular purpose of the prayer was to solemnize the occasion. 218 
As to effect, the court[ without citing it, essentially followed 
its reasoning in Marsh. 2 9 The court found that non-sectarian 
prayer under certain circumstances is so entrenched in the na-
tion's history as to have become part of a civil religion of "cere-
monial deism."220 The court refused to enjoin the graduation 
prayer. 
7. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools (I and II/21 
In Stein I, 222 the district court applied the Lemon test, and 
in Stein //223 the circuit court applied the Marsh test. The 
graduation ceremonies at issue varied with the schools. The 
students in some schools selected a minister to give an invoca-
tion and benediction. While these speeches were not reviewed, 
the minister was instructed to keep them "nondenomina-
tional."224 In other schools, students were selected to give both 
commencement addresses and the invocation and benediction. 
However, the "administration in no way attempt[ed] to monitor 
the content of [the student] presentation."225 As for the student 
messages, the district court applied Lemon and held that the 
secular purpose for the speeches was to "provide some form of 
solemn opening and closing" for graduation. 226 The second pur-
pose was to permit the students to plan or ~articipate in the 
ceremonies without control by the school.22 The court then 
216. As these courts demonstrate, "purpose" is confusing in the first place as to 
what to focus on. 
217. Griffith, 794 F. Supp. at 1058-59 (citation omitted). 
218. Id. at 1059. Prayer invariably has a religious purpose. See Karen B. v. Treen, 
653 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981). By the same token, prayer could almost always be found 
to have some higher secular purpose. 
219. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
220. ld. The court's entanglement discussion was a one sentence conclusion. 
221. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406. 
222. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43. 
223. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406. 
224. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 45. 
225. Id. 
226. I d. at 48. 
227. Id. 
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gave six reasons why there was no unconstitutional effect: (1) 
graduation is voluntary; (2) "the school itself is not composing a 
prayer;"228(3) there is no daily indoctrination; (4) the audience 
is older; (5) graduation is not part of the educational program; 
and (6) the speakers do not proselytize. 229 The court found that 
there was no entanglement because this was a once a year pro-
23o gram. 
The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
Marsh test, not the Lemon test was appropriate. The court re-
manded the case for the district court to enter an order requir-
ing that the invocations be nonsectarian and non-
proselytizing. 231 Only if that were true could the prayers be 
"'civil' invocations or benedictions"232 or be part of "the Ameri-
can civil religion" which the court in Stein II found to be ap-
proved in Marsh v. Chambers. 233 According to the circuit court, 
graduation prayers would be permissible as long as they were 
non -denomina tiona I. 
8. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Districe34 
The most important pre-Lee case was Jones I, 235 in which 
the Clear Creek Independent School District adopted the fol-
lowing policy: 
1. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school 
graduation exercise shall rest with the discretion of the 
graduating senior class, with the advice and counsel of the 
senior class principal; 2. The invocation and benediction, if 
used, shall be given by a student volunteer; and 3. Consistent 
with the principle of equal liberty of conscience, the invoca-
tion and benediction shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytiz-
228. ld. at 49. 
229. Id. at 49-50. 
230. /d. at 50. 
231. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1410. 
232. Id. 
233. ld. at 1409. 
234. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). Here, graduating seniors and parents brought 
suit against the school district to enjoin them from permitting invocations and benedic-
tions at a high school graduation ceremony. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded 
to the 5th Circuit. 
235. /d. at 417. As will be discussed later, its importance lies in the fact that it was 
also the first graduation prayer case to be reviewed after Lee. Because the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the constitutionality of student-led prayer after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lee, it caused graduation prayer policies and cases to focus on the "student prayer" or 
"voluntary prayer" approach. 
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. . 236 
mgm nature. 
Applying Lemon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the constitutionality of this policy. 
As to purpose, the court held that the secular purpose of the 
prayer was to solemnize the graduation ceremonies.237 In so 
holding, the court relied on and quoted from Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Lynch, that "'government acknowledg-
ments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in 
our culture, the legitimate secular purpose of solemnizing pub-
lic occasions'."238 
Beyond holding that a prayer has a secular purpose at 
graduation, the circuit court found that prayer was the only 
way to accomplish the secular purpose of solemnization: 
But to say that the Resolution employs a 'religious means' is 
to confuse purpose and effect analysis under Lemon. Unlike 
the laws at issue in Lubbock and Treen, the resolution takes 
no position on whether a proposed invocation references a de-
ity, and only seeks to limit sectarianism and proselytization. 
The Resolution does not employ an obviously religious means 
to solemnize Clear Creek graduation ceremonies. Moreover, 
we are unaware of an exclusively secular equivalent for Clear 
Creek's solemnization choice (emphasis added).239 
Before reviewing the purpose of the policy, the court held 
that the jolicy need not have had "exclusively secular objec-
tive[s]."24 A purpose is invalid, the court held, only if a policX 
had no secular purpose or the purpose suggested is a sham. 2 1 
Given that the court had held that prayer was essential to the 
accomplishment of the solemnization purpose, the court easily 
found the policy to be valid under its understanding of the 242 Lemon purpose prong. 
As to the effect prong, the court "focus[ed] on an invoca-
tion's effect in the context of an entire graduation ceremony."243 
236. Id. 
237. ld. at 420. 
238. Id. at 420 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
239. ld. 
240. I d. at 419. 
241. Id. at n.2. 
242. Once again, this court's approach demonstrates the difficulty of the Lemon 
test. This court looked to the "purpose" of the policy. This is slightly different than the 
purpose of the prayer or the purpose of the graduation. 
243. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 421 n.161 (related to the Miller obscenity test). This con-
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The context, much the same "context" relied upon in Stein I, 
was: (1) the invocation was brief; (2) the invocation was only 
once in four years; (3) the invocation audience was older and 
included parents; (4) the invocation was denominatively neu-
tral; and (5) the state action was "passive," merely "facilitating" 
the invocation.244 The court used the passive nature of the 
schools involvement to distinguish the Clear Creek pra~er at 
graduation from the school prayer prohibited in Engel. 45 Ac-
cording to the circuit court, Clear Creek "facilitates invocations, 
but it leaves their existence and reference to a deity, to the dis-
cretion of each graduating class and student volunteer."246 The 
circuit court emphasized that the effects question focused on 
what the "government itself [does] through its own activities 
and influence."247 
The circuit court also found no entanglement. First, the 
ceremony occurs only once and consequently, the school does 
not continuously oversee secular activities. 248 Second, the policy 
excluded sectarian speeches, which eliminated any entangle-
ment with religious organizations. Entanglement was, accord-
ing to the court, "impossible."249 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah followed 
Jones I in Albright v. Board of Education of Granite School Dis-
trict.250 The actual decision denying a preliminary injunction 
involved the Alpine School District. 
The policy of the District [was] to permit prayer on a volun-
tary, non-discriminatory basis, at the request of the graduat-
ing class, with 'participating students selected on the basis of 
scholastic achievement, without regard to religious affiliation, 
preference or belief. Such students [were] counseled only to 
speak in non sectarian, non doctrinal and non proselytizing 
text approach is also similar to that taken in the creche cases. See County of Allegheny 
v. American Civil Liberties Union 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
244. Jones, 930 F.2d at 422. 
245. Id. 
246. ld. 
247. Id. (quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
248. ld. at 422-23. Furthermore, any oversight and review that occurred, would 
occur prior to the graduation ceremony. At the time of the ceremony, no such oversight 
occurred or could occur. 
249. ld. at 423. 
250. 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1991). 
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terms so as to represent and respect diverse views.'251 
The court noted that the facts in Jones I were "similar" and 
followed the reasoning in Jones I with regard to the application 
of the Lemon test. 252 
The district court in Albright also looked to Marsh in up-
holding the validity of the policy. 253 Indeed, the court predicted 
that the Supreme Court would apply Marsh to graduation 
prayer and uphold its validity.254 The district court conse-
quently upheld the prayer at issue under what it termed the 
"Ceremonial Occasion Exception."255 Finally, the court noted 
the importance of the fact that the student's speeches were not 
. d d "t d 256 rev1ewe an mom ore . 
U7 . UB 9. Brody v. Spang and Gmdry v. Broussard 
The last two Lee graduation prayer cases of interest are 
Brody v. Spang and Guidry v. Broussard. Brody is significant 
not for the court's decision on prayer, but for its lengthy discus-
sion of creating a public forum at graduation. Likewise, Guidry 
is not important for the specific result, but for the question 
raised by the plaintiff. 
In Brody, the plaintiffs filed suit against Dowington High 
School alleging that "inclusion of religious benedictions and in-
vocations at graduation ceremonies" violated the Establish-
ment Clause. The court does not clearly state who gave the 
prayers or under whose direction or guidance. The school im-
mediately settled the case the day it was filed. The settlement 
included the following restriction: 
251. !d. at 684 (footnote omitted). 
252. !d. at 688. 
253. See e.g., Albright, 765 F. Supp. 682. 
254. !d. at 689. 
255. !d. at 688-89. The district court rejected the argument that the "ceremonial 
occasion exception" was limited to legislative prayer. 
256. Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 688-89. This court also found it to be of constitu-
tional significance that the prayer was directed to be nonsectarian and nonproselytiz-
ing. This court, like others, essentially found that excluding atheists was constitution-
ally valid, but that a sectarian prayer, which excludes atheists and those with other 
beliefs might be invalid. 
257. 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992). 
258. 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990). 
259. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1111. The court's use of the phrase "inclusion of religious 
benedictions," is typical. The passive language merely says that prayers were given at 
graduation. The phrase does not say how the prayers were solicited for graduation. It 
eliminates responsibility and notes only existence. !d. 
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Defendants, their successors, agents, employees and those 
acting by their invitation shall not pray, proselytize with re-
spect to religion, or engage in any religious ceremony or activ-
ity during the annual commencement exercises or any other 
official event at the Dowington Senior High School. Except 
with respect to students invited to speak at graduation, noth-
ing in this agreement shall be interpreted to restrict any stu-
dent's first amendment rights.260 
As the court noted later, this restriction, on its face, prohib-
ited students who were invited to speak at graduation from 
speaking in religious terms, even if such prohibition limited 
these students' First Amendment rights. 261 In response to this 
order, another group of students sought to intervene in order to 
protect the First Amendment rights of student speakers at 
graduation. 
The intervening students262 argued that graduation was a 
public forum, and consequently that those students who the 
school invited to speak could not be prohibited from giving reli-
gious speeches. The court gave reasons why it thought that 
graduation could not be a public forum. Interestingly, the court 
then remanded the case for a determination of whether the 
school created a public forum after expressly holding that it 
was at least possible for a school to make graduation a public 
forum. 263 
If, for example, school officials have authorized students to 
choose which of them will speak, and have permitted these 
speakers to select their own topics, including controversial 
subject matters, then officials may have created a limited 
public forum. Not only would such a practice demonstrate an 
intent to foster public discourse, but it would also avoid at-
taching the imprimaturs of the school to the views expressed 
. d ' h 264 m stu ents speec es. 
The court essentially took the standards for determining 
what makes a public forum and applied them specifically to 
graduation. 
260. Id. at 1112 n.2. 
261. Id. at 1117 ("[T]his consent decree provision, on its face, clearly permits an 
infringement of otherwise existing First Amendment rights of students."). 
262. These students were not granted the right to intervene by the district court, 
and the circuit court remanded the case for a determination whether intervention 
should be granted. For the purpose of this discussion, these students were intervenors. 
263. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1120. 
264. Id. 
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The court's analysis of the forum question revolved around 
demonstrating (1) the intent of the school and (2) "the extent of 
the use" of the forum granted.265 These issues were to be con-
sidered in light of, and not to be determined by, the persons al-
lowed to speak. The school could create a limited public forum 
by limiting "the pool of potential graduation speakers" to a 
small group of people such as "members of the school commu-
nity" and granting "'indiscriminate use'" of the forum to that 
limited pool. 266 This discussion is premised on the principle that 
student speech and school speech is not the same. 
This distinction also provided the basis of the plaintiffs 
claims in Guidry. 267 Guidry was valedictorian of her high school 
and as such had the right to speak at her graduation. She 
wanted to give a religious speech, but the principal forbade it. 
She claimed that her First Amendment rights were violated. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case for 
mootness and thereby avoided the constitutional questions. 
The holding, analysis, and rationale of Guidry are of no 
particular significance.268 However, this case highlights the 
vast factual differences in the graduation prayer cases. They 
run from the valedictorian, who is invited to speak but prohib-
ited from praying,269 to the school principal, who invites a rabbi 
to give a prayer but only a particular kind of prayer. 270 At the 
same time, the plaintiff in Guidry presents, as perhaps no 
other plaintiff does, the contrast between the desires of a pri-
vate citizen, who has at least a qualified right to speak at 
graduation, and the school. This highlights the argument that 
private speech and government speech are not the same. 
IV. POST LEE ISSUES 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Lee v. Weis-
265. Id. at 1117. 
266. ld. at 1120, (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)). 
267. Guidry, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990). 
268. Guidry is one of several graduation prayer cases in which the court dismissed 
the case for mootness or standing. See also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 
1475 (11th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993) affd in part, reu'd 
in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 241 v. Harris, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). 
269. Guidry, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990). 
270. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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man
271 
and Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District. 272 
In Lee, the Court ruled that the graduation prayers at issue 
violated the Establishment Clause. Rather than ruling on the 
merits in Jones, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's order in 
light of Lee.273 However, having granted certiorari in both cases 
the court could have answered many, if not most, of the ques-
tions raised by lower courts in the prior two decades. Instead, 
the Court reviewed the easiest factual question and answered 
it in a fashion that provided few answers for the questions 
raised by the courts below. In addition to leaving questions 
open, the Court raised questions that had not been raised be-
fore. 
A. The Choice: The Lemon Analysis or the Marsh Analysis 
In one of the earliest cases,274 Stein II was the only court 
that did not consider the constitutionality of prayer at gradua-
tion pursuant to the either Lemon tese75 or at least two prongs 
therein; instead, it chose to apply Marsh. 276 
The circuit court in Stein II held that Marsh permitted the 
existence of a civil religion where (1) the religion was nonsec-
tarian, and nonproselytizing277 and (2) the practice is rooted in 
common practice, tradition or history. 278 However, the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the application of Marsh to high school 
d t . 279 gra ua Ions. 
In so doing the Court opened the door for arguing that gov-
ernment-created prayer is constitutional "where adults are free 
to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of 
271. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
272. 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). 
273. Id. 
274. Wood, 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
275. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1090; Sands I, 262 
Cal. Rptr. at 452; Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809; Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 682; Bennett, 193 
Cal. App. 3d at 1012; Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 883; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 531; Griffith, 
794 F. Supp. at 1054; Jones, 505 U.S. at 1215; Kay, 719 P.2d at 875; Lundberg, 731 F. 
Supp. at 331; Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43. 
276. Wiest, 320 A.2d at 362; Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 285. As discussed earlier, 
these cases did not mention Lemon but relied on two parts of the Lemon test. 
277. Id. at 1409. 
278. Id. at 1408-09. While the circuit court did not expressly refer to common prac-
tice, it did note the existence of prayer at "thousands of public graduation exercises an-
nually." 
279. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. 
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reasons."
280 The Court emphasized this distinction between 
adults and children throughout the rest of the opinion.281 For 
example, the Court did "not address" the question of whether 
the choices given to primary and secondary school children un-
der the facts presented would be "acceptable if the affected citi-
zens [were] mature adults."282 The Court also noted "that ado-
lescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers 
toward conformity."283 
While the Court expressly rejected Marsh, at least as to 
high school graduations, it did not expressly rely on Lemon, 
therebsY inviting immediate suggestions that Lemon was 
dead. 2 4 Failure to rely on Lemon was particularly interesting 
in the Lee case. Because almost every lower court had applied 
it, the Court clearly had a foundation from which to apply the 
Lemon test in its own fashion. More than one court had found 
that graduation prayers, similar to those reviewed in Lee, vio-
lated each part of the Lemon test. Finally, Justice Blackmun, 
in concurrence, essentially applied the effect prong of the 
Lemon test. 285 
Having rejected Marsh and ignored Lemon, the Court could 
have turned to Engel or Abington, or both, but it did not. 286 
While the Court did not ignore its school prayer cases, it did 
not use them as the cases that created the appropriate Estab-
lishment Clause test. Instead, the Court used a coercion test. 
Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff 
was coerced, forced, or pressured into joining in the prayer. 287 
280. !d. 
281. !d. at 593. 
282. !d. 
283. !d. 
284. Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court today demonstrates 
the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring it ... and the interment of that case 
may be the one happy by-product of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision."). As it 
turns out, not only was Scalia's prediction of interment premature, he was one of five 
votes to give Justice O'Connor the majority needed to resurrect/rewrite the Lemon test 
in Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Of course, given Lemon's checkered past, this 
too, may be at best temporary. 
285. !d. at 603-604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
286. How those cases, Engel in particular, may have aided the Court is discussed 
later. 
287. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 592-595, 597. 
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B. Voluntariness 
In finding coercion, the court rejected the argument based 
upon voluntary attendance made in and accepted by a number 
of courts in pre-Lee graduation prayer cases. 288 The Supreme 
Court rejected the idea ofvoluntariness holding that peer pres-
sure made attendance essentially mandatory. 289 The Court 
held: 
[a]ttendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is 
apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the 
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary," 
for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible bene-
fits which have motivated the student through her youth and 
all her high school years.290 
Because students were "forced" to be at graduation, the 
Court easily concluded that they were "forced" to be part of, 
and subjected to, religious activities. 291 
In Lee, the school argued that even if this was a technical 
violation, the courts should not prohibit graduation prayer be-
cause the violation was de minimis.292 Similarly, lower courts 
had argued that the prayer was valid because of the context of 
graduation. 293 Some courts had noted that the prayer was only 
a few minutes of an entire ceremony,294 and graduation oc-
curred only once per year. 295 The Court, while not discussing 
288. Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. 285; Wiest, 320 A.2d 362; Wood, 342 F. Supp. 1293. 
289. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594-95. 
290. ld. at 595. This conclusion is founded on the irrefutable "[e]veryone 
knows ... " Id. According to the Court, what "[e]veryone knows" is that "high school 
graduation is one of life's most significant occasions." Presumably this is not accurate 
for the millions of people who do not graduate from high school, nor is it likely to be 
true for those students who skip high school graduation. This finding takes judicial no-
tice to a new level. The Court found as fact that all people feel the same way about a 
general event. Presumably, the Court can also make assumptions (i.e., findings) about 
people's views toward birth, marriage, and death. Indeed, the Court does make those 
kind of assumptions. Perhaps what is most incredible about the Court's finding is its 
prefatory phrase "everyone knows." Not only is the phrase incredibly informal, it im-
plies weakness. It is almost a personal attack on those who would dare disagree. The 
only thing missing explicitly (and almost in the opinion implicitly) is: "[djon't you know 
anything, everyone knows ... " Id. 
291. ld. at 593, 596. 
292. ld. at 594. 
293. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1991) va-
cated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). 
294. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. 43, 49. 
295. Id. 
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each of these arguments, clearly dismissed them saying, "[t]he 
embarrassment and intrusion of the religious exercise cannot 
be refuted by ar~uing that these prayers ... are of a de mini-
mis character."29 
C. Ceremonial Deism 
Lower courts have also argued that prayer is not prayer 
if it is part of our "civic religion."297 Under this argument, a 
prayer becomes acceptable if it is rendered so often that it loses 
its religious connotations. Courts proffered the phrase, "In God 
We Trust," as well as the opening prayer before the courts, to 
support their thinking.298 One of the requirements for inclusion 
in the civic religion, however, is that the prayer be nonsectar-
ian and non proselytizing. 299 The Lemon test encouraged these 
holdings. The courts held that the purpose and effect of these 
prayers was not to advance religion because they were not ad-
vancing "a" religion. The prayers were simply setting a solemn 
or respectful tone. 
The Lee Court rejected the ceremonial deism argument. 300 
To suggest that the prayers had no religious meaning the Court 
held, "would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to 
all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound 
recognition of divine authority."301 The Court even turned 
around the suggestion that nonsectarian prayer might be more 
acceptable. The Court said that while the number of persons 
offended or injured by nonsectarian prayer might be fewer, for 
some "their sense of isolation and affront" might actually in-
crease.302 A prayer, then, is a prayer, whether it is short or long 
or whether it is sectarian or nonsectarian. At best, this conclu-
sion held true in Lee. 
296. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594. 
297. This "civic religion" has been used in one court to uphold saying the Pledge of 
Allegiance in school. 
298. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 602 
(1989). 
299. !d. 
300. !d. Various justices have argued in favor of the validity of ceremonial deism in 
other contexts. 
301. Lee, 505 US. at 594. 
302. !d. 
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D. Coercion 
In declaring the graduation prayer to be unconstitutionalj 
the Court in Lee emphasized the narrowness of its decision. 30 
Although the Court found that tremendous social coercion often 
"requires" high school students to attend graduation ceremo-
nies, the Court conceded that adults might be different. 304 The 
Court's express notation of this distinction invites arguments 
that the distinction makes a constitutional difference. This is 
particularly true due to the Court's conclusion that the social 
coercion of the high school students to join religious activities is 
why those state-sponsored religious activities are invalid. The 
argument to be made is that state sponsored religious activities 
305 
are acceptable where people are not coerced to conform. 
The irony of this coercion distinction is that no court that 
considered graduation prayer prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lee had held that prayers were acceptable because 
they were voluntary.306 Indeed, they cited to Engel or Abington 
for the proposition that voluntariness was irrelevant. Conse-
quently, the Court reinvigorated an argument that the Court 
killed and buried thirty years earlier. 
E. Lemon Purpose Test 
The Court also created confusion by not applying the Lemon 
test.
307 More importantly, the Court abdicated, or at least 
shirked, its responsibility to explain Lemon. Except for the first 
few graduation prayer cases, the lower courts had consistently 
declared graduation prayer invalid where the school had cho-
sen the speaker and chosen to have a prayer. The disagree-
ments arose as the facts changed so that the school had less in-
put into the choice to have a prayer. The more important 
disagreements were how to properly apply Lemon, in particu-
lar, how to apply the Lemon test to purpose and effect. 
303. Id. at 586. The Court began its opinion stating, "[t]hese dominant facts mark 
and control the confines of our decision ... " 
304. Id. at 593. 
305. This argument has not only been made but accepted by at least one court with 
regard to graduation at state colleges. See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 
(1997). 
306. While some courts noted the voluntariness of attendance, no court has held 
that coercion was necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation. 
307. As noted earlier this invited Justice Scalia's premature speculation that 
Lemon might be dead. 
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With regard to purpose and effect, the courts have debated 
over whether to look at the purpose and effect of the graduation 
or of the prayer. Some courts have held that the question is 
what was the purpose and effect of graduation. They asked 
whether the graduation ceremony had the purpose or effect of 
endorsing or approving religion. Other courts focused on the 
prayer itself, asking what is the purpose of prayer. The courts 
almost invariably took a tautological approach to reach oppo-
site results, each reasonable in light of two reasonable readings 
of Lemon. 
Some courts noted that Lemon merely requires a secular 
purpose. Those courts concluded that graduation prayers al-
ways had the similar purpose of solemnizing an event. The con-
clusion is obvious and almost tautological. Indeed, it is very 
reasonable that all religion has, and most religious activities 
have, a secular purpose. Without extensive philosophical dis-
cussion, it is at least reasonable to argue that a secular purpose 
could invariably include, inspiration to greatness, peace, hap-
piness or morality. By the same token, prayer is by necessity 
always religious, because it is only religious prayer which is 
subject to Establishment Clause restrictions. Consequently, 
other courts simply conclude the purpose and effect of prayer is 
always religious. Instead of making any effort to shed light on 
these problems, the Court ignored them, thereby passing on a 
chance to provide enlightenment concerning a test which has 
been difficult to apply. 
The final irony of the Lemon purpose test is that one of the 
Court's first cases to use the test was Abington.308 The school 
had argued that it could lead students in prayer if the purpose 
were "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the 
materialistic trends of our institutions and the teaching of lit-
erature."309 Rather than simply reject this position as irrelevant 
the Court found that the purpose of the school prayer was reli-
gious and helped spawn the confusion in the area of graduation 
prayer, which it did little to clear up in Lee. 
F. Government Speech I Private Speech 
Besides relying on coercion as a reason to declare gradua-
tion prayer invalid, the Court's opinion in Lee also parallels 
308. See Abington u. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
309. Id. at 223. 
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Engel in other respects. There, the Court summarized the 
Engel holding as follows: "[i]t is a cornerstone principle of our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any 
group of the American people to recite as part of a religious 
program carried on by the government'."310 The most common 
questions courts asked about graduation included whether 
graduation was a "religious program carried on by the govern-
ment,"311 and whether graduation prayer was an official prayer. 
Indeed, the first court to address these questions directly, in 
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District, distinguished 
prayer in classrooms from graduation prayer saying, "in the 
present case we do not have what amounts to official prayer, 
nor does it constitute a religious program."312 
Some courts suggested that because the prayer occurred 
only one time, it was not part of a prayer program and there-
fore permissible. Because these courts used the Lemon test, 
they did not usually reference Engel or Abington directly. In-
stead, they attempted to distinguish the facts of these cases. 
Some suggested distinctions were that (1) graduation was not 
part of the regular curriculum; (2) attendance was not manda-
tory; (3) no money was spent for the prayer per se; (4) the 
schools did not have a regular program of indoctrination. Like 
many other courts, the Supreme Court in Lee also rejected 
these positions. 
In Lee, the Court refused to distinguish Engel. Instead, the 
Court focused on the state's action and held that the prayer 
was a state prayer program. Under Engel and Abington, that 
would be enough to find a constitutional violation. The Court 
needed to go no further from holding that graduation is part of 
the entire school program. The holdings of Abington and Engel 
easily encompassed a holding that graduation is an official 
school event and that official prayer at such an event violated 
the constitution. 313 
310. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (quoting from Engel, 370 U.S. at 425). 
311. Id. 
312. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 
1972). 
313. As discussed earlier, the Court significantly weakened the strength of the 
Engel protections by discussing coercion as a separate element of the solution. The cor-
rect understanding of the Establishment Clause is that coercion is inherent wherever 
the government engages in religious exercises. See Engel, 370 U. S. 421; Abington, 374 
U.S. 203. 
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The final attempt to distinguish Engel and Abington, again 
in the Lemon context, related to the question of whether the 
graduation prayer was "official." In Engel, New York adopted a 
program requiring daily participation in classroom prayers. In 
Abington, a Pennsylvania statute required students to read 
from The Bible. In other words, the State used prayers com-
posed by someone else. In Lee, a third party was asked to com-
pose a prayer and told what kind of prayer to comEose. Here, 
the Court relied on Engel's "cornerstone principle."3 4 Through-
out the opinion, the Court emphasized that the government 
may not compose official prayers nor ask others to do so on its 
behalf. The Court wrote: "our precedents do not permit school 
officials to assist in composing prayers"315 and "the principal di-
~16 
rected and controlled the content of the prayers." Once the 
Court found that the school had essentially composed the 
prayer, Lee became indistinguishable from Engel and Abington. 
The Court's emphasis on state involvement in the composi-
tion of the prayer accomplished more than showing the simi-
larities between Lee, Engel and Abington. At the beginning of 
the Court's analysis, it notes, "[t]hese dominant facts mark and 
control the confines of our decision: State officials direct the 
performance of a formal religious exercise ... "317 The Court 
then noted that "government involvement with religious activ-
ity in this case is pervasive."318 Other significant facts were 
that the State decided to have a prayer, decided who would say 
it and directed that it conform to certain principles.319 The gov-
ernment may not "undertake" for itself, the court said, the 
"task" of composing nonsectarian prayer, which seeks to ad-
vance "community and purpose."320 In the end, the Court notes 
that its "Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a deli-
cate and fact-sensitive one."321 
These statements alone invite efforts to distinguish facts. 
However, these statements are not the only invitation in Lee. 
The end of the opinion in particular invites efforts to distin-
314. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
315. I d. at 590. 
316. I d. at 588. 
317. Id. at 586. 
318. Id. at 587. 
319. I d. 
320. Id. at 589. 
321. Id. at 597. 
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guish prayer created by the state from other prayer at gradua-
tion. The opinion contains three passages that strongly suggest 
that religion is not to be banished from ever coming into con-
tact with the State. Furthermore, it also suggests that being of-
fended, even deeply offended, by religious practices at any par-
ticular time does not mean the religious activity violates the 
First Amendment. The Court stated: 
We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is 
invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may 
take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious 
messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a 
violation. We know too that sometimes to endure social 
isolation or even anger may be the price of conscience or 
nonconformity. 
* * * 
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by 
any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is 
designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substan-
tially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring 
of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact. It is of 
course true that great consequences can grow from small be-
ginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the 
ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and 
mere shadow. School Dist. of Abington u. Schempp, supra3 374 U.S., at 308, 83 S. Ct .. , at 1616 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 22 
These two passages are perhaps oblique invitations to dis-
tinguish Lee. Their significance was greatly enhanced by the 
Court's last passage, which clearly indicated that the result 
would not necessarily be the same if the facts were different. 
A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion 
from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsis-
tent with the Constitution. 
*** 
We recognize that, at graduation time and throughout the 
course of the education process, there will be instances when 
religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will 
have some interaction with the public schools and their stu-
dents. See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools 
u. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed.2d 191 
322. ld. at 598. 
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(1990). But these matters, often questions of accommodation 
f l . . b fi 323 o re IgiOn, are not e ore us. 
Particularly si,pnificant to this passage is the Court's cita-
tion to Mergens. 02 In Mergens, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act.325 The plurality's 
opinion in Mergens turned on distinguishing government 
speech from "private speech."326 With regard to government 
speech, religious expression is almost, if not completely, prohib-
ited.127 This is particularly true if it is part of a religious exer-
cise.:128 With regard to private speech, the government must be 
neutral.a29 Not only does Mergens hold that private religious 
speech may be allowed when the same speech by the govern-
ment is prohibited, it does so in the context of public schools. 
330 In the last quoted passages from Lee, the Supreme Court 
ties together a number of principles not necessary to the dispo-
sition of Lee: (1) State action implicating religion is not neces-
sarily invalid; (2) a religious practice, even one implicating 
state action, is not invalid simply because some are offended or 
even forced into social isolation; (3) the Court will "distinguish 
between real threat and mere shadow;"331 (4) private speech 
can be protected religious expression, even in schools; and (5) 
at graduation time, "religious practices ... will have some in-
teraction with the public schools and their students."332 
How these principles might be written or rewritten is not of 
particular significance. What is important is the question 
which is clearly left open, indeed invited. While the question 
could be written other ways, one way of stating the question is: 
whether and under what circumstances the First Amendment 
prohibits a student from saying a prayer at graduation. If Lee 
clearly left any question regarding graduation prayer unan-
swered, that was it. The Court focused significantly on the fact 
323. !d. at 598-99. 
324. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
325. !d.; See 20 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4071(a). 
326. !d. at 228. 
327. !d. 
328. Engel, 370 U. S. 421. 
329. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 228-229. 
330. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, 599. 
331. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598 (quoting Abington, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring)). 
332. !d. at 598-99. 
158 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
that the principal chose to have a prayer, chose a religious per-
son to say the prayer and directed the content of the prayer. 
The Court then gratuitously discussed the constitutional pro-
tection of private/student religious activities in both the school 
and graduation context. 
Even if these discussions were not an invitation to distin-
guish student prayers at graduation, they certainly provide 
sufficient material to make a good faith argument that student 
prayers are constitutionally distinguishable from those solic-
ited by the principal in Lee. 
The fact that this question is left open is further supported 
by the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in a student-speech 
graduation prayer case which was later remanded in light of 
Lee. 333 Clearly, the Court was aware of the arguments distin-
guishing government speech from private/student speech at 
graduation. Just as clearly, the Court did not attempt to an-
swer the question. And finally, the Court went out of its way to 
distinguish government speech from private speech. Given that 
our jurisprudence is based on factual distinctions, the Court 
could hardly have made a more obvious invitation to argue that 
student prayer at graduation is constitutionally different from 
the school's prayer at graduation.334 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lee rejected Marsh, ignored Lemon and weakened Engel. 
The court was presented with the problem of how to apply 
Lemon and refused to provide guidance. The Court followed 
Engel's principle that the government may not engage in reli-
gious exercises but gratuitously added that such might not be 
the case where adults are not coerced to conform. Finally, the 
Court invited schools to defend student prayers at graduation. 
333. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). 
334. As it turned out, this distinction between student prayer and government 
prayer was the focus of much of the Court's decision in Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275. 
The Court rejected Santa Fe's argument that the prayer at issue was private prayer, 
but again implied that a prayer at school functions might be private prayer. The Court 
noted, "[t)hese invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on 
government property at government-sponsored school related events." !d. at 2266. The 
next sentence undercut the significance of those facts saying, "of course, not every mes-
sage delivered under such circumstances is the government's own." !d. The clear impli-
cation remains that prayer, as private prayer, might be constitutionally permissible 
even at public school ceremonies. 
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The Court should have held Lemon to be irrelevant with regard 
to religious exercises. It also should have followed Engel and 
simply held that the government cannot create prayers and 
prayer programs by asking others to create the prayers for the 
government. This would prohibit prayers by ministers, stu-
dents or anyone else, if the prayers had been requested or 
urged by the government. 
